Lupe Esparza's Trial Brief

The C n Law Firm 1541 c enue, Suite 200 Santa Murray, California 90401 (310) 394-1420 intended to reward her.

In 1999, Ms. Lopez deeded two pieces of real property in Los Angeles to Ms. Esparza after her son Richard Esparza (Lupe's brother) and sister Beatrice Rosales filed a conservatorship lawsuit to wrest control of their mother's money.

This lawsuit pertains to the efforts of the Estate (controlled by Ms. Lopez's siblings, none of whom were caretakers for their mother) to reclaim the subject real property. It also pertains to Ms. Esparza's efforts to be compensated for (1) the years of service she provided caring for her mother Decedent Lopez, and (2) the repairs and maintenance that Ms. Esparza caused to be provided for the subject real property since Ms. Lopez died.

The lawsuit also seeks to rescind a 2005 transaction in which Las Vegas con artist Jack Whitehorn – who has admitted under oath to engaging in the unlicensed practice of law – tricked Ms. Esparza into deeding to him a 50% interest in the two subject properties.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. <u>Lupe Esparza</u>

Lupe Esparza is 71 years old and the daughter of Decedent Amelia Lopez. Ms. Esparza attended high school and later took classes at a community college. During her life, she worked in a variety of aircraft or electronics factories, as a truck driver, as a cashier, and as a live-in caretaker for the elderly. She has no education or training in the law or real estate.

B. Pete Lozano

Pete Lozano is the adult son of Ms. Esparza. He was a truck driver before becoming disabled. Since 2005 he has helped his mother with doing repairs and maintenance at the subject real properties.

C. Beatrice Rosales

Beatrice Rosales is the sister of Lupe Esparza. She is the current executor of the Estate but admitted to the Court on the record (through her lawyer on June 19, 2007) that she does not want to serve as the Executor.

Ms. Rosales either lives or spends most of her time in Washington state. For over a

decade, she has spent much of her time driving around the nation in an expensive motor home that she bought with money that her mother lent her (and which has yet to be repaid).

D. Richard Esparza

Richard Esparza is the brother of Lupe Esparza. He is a retired police officer.

E. Jack Whitehorn

Respondent Jack Whitehorn attended two years of law school at the University of Tennessee in the 1950. Whitehorn did not graduate, and he never sat for the bar anywhere. In 1960, Whitehorn bought a small radio station (WFDR) in Manchester, Georgia, which he ran from there for 21 years. During this time, Whitehorn himself handled all legal matters involving the FCC.

In 1979, Whitehorn moved to Las Vegas. After about seven years, he started working there as a "legal consultant" who charges \$395/hour. By Whitehorn's own admission at deposition (before he asserted the 5th Amendment) his "consulting work" includes charging laymen \$395/hour to prepare wills and trusts that are "good to go." He also had a fraud judgment entered against him in Tennessee involving real estate.

F. <u>Lupe Esparza's Return to Los Angeles To Care For Her Parents</u>

In 1988, Lupe Esparza was working in Reno, NV. At the request of her parents, Ms. Esparza returned to Los Angeles to help care for her father. After caring for him for years, Ms. Esparza assumed responsibility of caring for her elderly mother Decedent Amelia Lopez.

In appreciation for her efforts, Lupe's parents told her that they would care and provide for her. In 1993, as a partial action on this promise, her mother Ms. Lopez amended the codicil to her will to provide that Lupe would receive a home that Decedent Lopez owned 1444 Playground Street ("Playground") in Los Angeles.

Throughout this period, Ms. Esparza provided daily care and daily companionship to her mother. Ms. Esparza would take Ms. Lopez shopping, to doctor's appointments, out for meals (Ms. Lopez enjoyed eating in modest restaurants and regularly talked about how she had "cooked enough" in her life), on excursions and out for meals. Although Ms. Lopez had remarried, her new husband often took trips to Mexico, at which times she particularly valued

Lupe's care and companionship.

At her mother's direction, Lupe Esparza also helped her mother collect rental income generated by a (combination) residential and commercial property that Ms. Lopez owned at 2427, 2429 and 2429 ½ Caesar Chavez Boulevard ("the Caesar Chavez property" or "Caesar Chavez"). They used this money to support Ms. Lopez and pay for the foregoing expenses.

G. Putting Lupe's Son Larry Lozano in Charge Of The Property

By the summer of 1999, Amelia Lopez had given Lupe Esparza a power of attorney so that Lupe could easily help manage her affairs. Lupe was receiving no compensation for the care and companionship she was giving her mother, or for the "managerial" duties she was providing.

In the summer of 1999, Lupe Esparza arranged for her adult son Larry Lozano to assume responsibility for managing Caesar Chavez. Concerned that tenants or vendors would not respect Larry's authority to act, on August 3, 1999 Ms. Esparza signed a deed conveying title in the property to her son Larry Lozano. Ms. Esparza had no intention of actually giving the property to her son Larry (no money was exchanged, no lawyer was consulted, and in fact Ms. Esparza did not execute the deed in a form so that it would be legally valid), and Larry Lozano later purported to convey title back to his mother in October 2000 after he stopped being in charge of the property.

H. Richard Esparza's Initiation of Litigation Without First Talking to His Sister Lupe.

At some point, Richard Esparza learned about Ms. Esparza's efforts to confer "managerial authority" on her son Larry. Rather than talk about it with Ms. Esparza, Richard collaborated with his sister Christina Fitzgerald and filed a lawsuit seeking to have a conservatorship appointed for his mother. He filed the action on October 6, 1999.

I. Amelia Lopez'a Giving The Playground Property To Lupe Esparza

Amelia Lopez did not like that two children who had little or no time to visit or care for her were now suing to get control of her money. She decided to do something about it.

On October 19, 1999 Ms. Lopez deeded title to the Playground property – which she already had devised to Lupe pursuant to the will's codicil – to Lupe.

J. The TRO

On October 28, 1999 Richard Esparza sought and obtained a TRO providing that the *status* quo be maintained and enjoining any transfers of Amelia Lopez'a property.

Amelia Lopez and Lupe Esparza attended the hearing. Ms. Esparza was cut off when she tried to speak, and she and her mother did not understand much of the proceedings.

At one point, Richard Esparza's lawyer raised the issue of \$52,000 in matured bond proceeds. Ms. Esparza told the Court that Ms. Lopez had directed her to withdraw the money and keep it so that her other children could not get control of it. The Court instructed that the money not be spent pursuant to the TRO.

On November 3, 1999 the Court extended the TRO to December 1, 1999.

H. Neurologist Richard Graham's November 12 Examination of Amelia Lopez

Ms. Lopez did not appreciate what she perceived as an attempt by her non-caring children to wrest control of her money. On November 12, 1999 she visited neurologist Richard Graham, who examined her. Dr. Graham issued an informal opinion stating that Ms. Lopez was competent to dispose of her affairs.¹

H. The Attempted Transfer of Caesar Chavez

On November 18, 1999 Ms. Lopez became further upset about Richard Esparza's efforts to seize control of her money. Ms. Lopez then instructed her daughter Lupe Esparza to take Ms. Lopez to a notary public. Ms. Esparza, dutiful to a fault, honored her mother's request. Ms. Lopez then executed a deed by which she transferred title in the Caesar Chavez property to Lupe Esparza.

I. The Examination By Psychologist Bonnie Wolkenstein

Meanwhile, Ms. Lopez was examined by psychologist Bonnie Wolkenstein on November 22, 1999 in conjunction with the conservatorship lawsuit.

During her examination, Dr. Wolkenstein failed to consider many points, did not test in an accepted manner, failed to test in a way that would have allowed for Ms. Lopez'a hearing problems (i.e., using written questions as a substitute for oral ones), apparently accepted at face

Neither Ms. Lopez nor anyone else submitted Dr. Graham's findings to the Court in the conservatorship proceeding (due apparently to a misunderstanding of how or when to use it).

value false accusations from Richard Esparza and Beatrice Rosales about Lupe physically mistreating their mother, otherwise failed to "test" the legitimacy of the information she was receiving from the children seeking the conservatorship, and appeared to have been subconsciously biased against finding that Ms. Lopez was competent.

Dr. Wolkenstein later issued a report on November 30, 1999 that was filed in the conservatorship lawsuit on December 2, 1999.

J. <u>Imposition of Conservator</u>

On December 18, 1999 the Court ordered the appointment of a conservatorship for Ms. Lopez – thereby making Richard Esparza the conservator of his mother.

K. Richard Esparza's Failure To Take Responsibility For His Mother's Affairs.

After being appointed conservator, Richard Esparza did nothing. He did not try to collect the rent on the Caesar Chavez property, did not ask talk to his mother and Lupe Esparza about the Caesar Chavez property, and did nothing to change the arrangement by which Lupe Esparza lived with and cared for Ms. Lopez. Nor did Richard Esparza seek to recover any of the \$52,000 in cash that was in Ms. Lopez's possession and which had been the subject of the now expired TRO.

As a result, Lupe Esparza continued – without compensation but in reliance on her mother's assurances that she was going to be provided for – to care for Ms. Lopez for years. [And the Estate continued to reap the benefit of having someone care for Ms. Lopez without the expense of a full-time caretaker, which can cost more than \$36,000 per year and which would have substantially depleted Ms. Lopez's assets.] Ms. Esparza continued to help her mother collect the monthly rent that Caesar Chavez generated and continued to use the money to pay for Ms. Lopez's living expenses.

L. The Disappearance of \$52,000 in Cash from Amelia Lopez's Home

At some point at the instruction of her mother, Lupe Esparza put most of the \$52,000 in a bag. She then concealed the bag by suspending it in a hole in the floor of a closet in the front bedroom of her mother's home on Elevado Terrace in Los Angeles. [Photographs on this hiding place will be presented as exhibits at trial.] The bag lay suspended under the home and could

have been seen only if (1) someone looked in the hole (which had a piece of furniture on top of it) or (2) looked under the house.

From time to time, Ms. Esparza and Ms. Lopez would use some of the money for Ms. Lopez's living expenses.

At some point well after the TRO had expired, Ms. Lopez and Ms. Esparza discovered that the bag was missing from the hole in the bedroom closet. The person who had access to this hole was Ms. Lopez's "new" husband Ramon Lopez. Mr. Lopez later denied taking the money, but his denials are suspect as far as Ms. Esparza is concerned. [At one point years earlier, Ramon Lopez made sexual advances to Ms. Esparza and tried to fondle her while her mother was sitting outside by the front door of their home. Ms. Esparza was horrified and rebuffed him.]

M. Ms. Esparza's Move to Las Vegas

In June 2002 Richard Esparza filed a petition in the conservatorship lawsuit to regain title to Caesar Chavez.

At some point (Ms. Esparza does not remember when but estimates it to have been after the filing of the 2002 petition), she went to a courthouse in conjunction with some legal proceeding and was told by a lawyer representing Richard Esparza (she does not remember his name) that she would be arrested if she were to continue collecting the rent that Caesar Chavez generated.

This threat scared Ms. Esparza, who lacked the foresight or presence of mind to consult with a lawyer for independent advice. Because Ms. Esparza had no job and no way of supporting herself, she got her son Larry to drive her to Las Vegas that same day to "start over." Ms. Esparza left with literally only the clothes on her back. In Las Vegas she found work as a caretaker for the elderly.

N. Ms. Lopez's Death

Amelia Lopez died in March 2005. Lupe's siblings did not warn her when the end was near so that she could say goodbye to her mother.

O. An Opportunity for Ms. Esparza to Sell Her Interests in Caesar Chavez and Playground

Shortly after Ms. Lopez died, Ms. Esparza was contacted by a lawyer named Caesar Reinoso. Mr. Reinoso had grown up in the real estate business and later turned to the law. He was looking for real estate that he could improve or "flip" at a profit and had come across Ms. Esparza's properties.

After some discussion, Ms. Esparza agreed to sell to Mr. Reinoso the two properties that she believed she had been given by her mother: Casear Chavez and Playground. The deal was that Mr. Reinoso would pay \$15,000, assume responsibility for prosecuting a lawsuit to quiet title, and then pay a total of \$450,000 once he had clear title.²

On or about March 12, 2005, Ms. Esparza, her son Pete and Mr. Reinoso met in Barstow (where Pete lived) at a bank and executed a contract for Mr. Reinoso to buy this real estate. Ms. Esparza also opened a bank account and deposited the \$15,000 that she received from Mr. Reinoso.

P. Getting Tricked By Jack Whitehorn

Ms. Esparza did the deal because she needed the money (she had little and was helping to support a grown son and his children) but she also worried whether she was getting a fair deal with a fair price. While mentioning her situation at the facility where she was caring for someone, a visitor named Mary Whitehorn told Ms. Esparza that her husband Jack Whitehorn might be able to help because he was a law school graduate and just as good as a lawyer even though he was not one himself. Ms. Esparza later talked with Mr. Whitehorn, who reiterated that he was "just as good as a lawyer" and might be able to "help" Ms. Esparza.

Ms. Esparza then arranged for Mr. Reinoso to meet with her and Mr. Whitehorn while Mr. Reinoso was in town to have grant deeds notarized. They met in Mr. Whitehorn's home. Mr. Whitehorn started telling Ms. Esparza that the deal was not fair and essentially talked Ms. Esparza out of consummating it. As this happened, it was apparent to Mr. Reinoso that Mr. Whitehorn was doing this so that he could try to insert himself into the transaction. And that is

²⁸ Richard Esparza effectively had abandoned the petition in the conservatorship lawsuit and never prosecuted it, and Ms. Esparza (who had no lawyer) had no idea about her rights or the status of title to the properties.

precisely what happened.

Mr. Whitehorn told Ms. Esparza that he could help her figure out whether she really had title to the two pieces of property but that to do so he would need to have his name on title so that people would "listen" to him. Turning on his Southern charm, Mr. Whitehorn duped Ms. Esparza – who previously had had the same false notion that an agent would not be heeded if his name were not on title (hence her purported transfer to son Larry Lozano while he was acting as caretaker) into believing this.

As a result, on March 25, 2005 Mr. Whitehorn caused Ms. Esparza not only to deed to him a 50% interest in each of the properties but also to sign an agreement providing that he would be paid 18% of their sale price (and be reimbursed for all legal fees) in return for his services of clearing up title to the subject real property. Mr. Whitehorn also caused Ms. Esparza to grant him a power of attorney. At all times, Ms. Esparza believed that the documents she had signed were a formality to help Mr. Whitehorn investigate her situation and that he would "undo" the transaction when he finished.

In return for these interests, Mr. Whitehorn paid \$15,000 to Mr. Reinoso, who was willing to walk away (he wanted an investment, not a lawsuit) if he received a refund of his deposit money. Mr. Whitehorn also apparently agreed to help Ms. Esparza pay enough of the overdue taxes on the properties to keep them from being sold.

Q. Collecting the Rent and Catching Up on Repairs at Caesar Chavez

After undertaking (in her mind) to have Mr. Whitehorn help clear things up, Ms. Esparza made arrangements to start collecting the rent from Caesar Chavez's residential and commercial tenants. She also assumed responsibility for maintaining the property.³

Caesar Chavez was in bad shape. Little had been done to maintain it between the time that Ms. Esparza had moved to Las Vegas and the death of Ms. Lopez in 2005.

Because Ms. Esparza was usually "tied" to Las Vegas with her job giving "24-7" inhome care for an elderly woman (the recently deceased Florence Kaiser, mother of recently

There was no rent to collect for the Playground property for most of this period. Relatives who were struggling financially were allowed to live there rent-free.

Since he assumed these duties in 2005, Pete Lozano has, on behalf of Lupe Esparza, responded to tenant requests for repairs at Caesar Chavez, repaired and maintained the premises, paid property taxes and required governmental fees, collected the rent, and otherwise managed the property.

Mr. Lozano's actions included spending at least \$24,923 for items that included supplies, fixtures, and materials. These items in turn were used on maintenance and repair projects that included plumbing, painting, repairing and welding the fence, installing a new fence, patching holes in walls, tile for four rooms and the lobby, replacing latches with door handles, removing carpet that had been glued to the floor, replacing 10 windows and 2 window frames (plus windows), making a frame for one window, repairing walls, buying smoke detectors, and replacing items pursuant to directives from the County of Los Angeles.

III. NO GROUNDS EXIST TO SET ASIDE MS. LOPEZ'S TRANSFER OF TITLE TO THE "PLAYGROUND" PROPERTY BECAUSE THERE WAS NO UNDUE INFLUENCE AND IT WOULD BE AN IDLE ACT GIVEN THAT MS. ESPARZA WAS SUPPOSED TO INHERIT IT.

A. Undue Influence

The amended petition (¶ 24) seeks to set aside Ms. Lopez's transfer of the Playground home on the grounds that it was effected by undue influence arising from Ms. Lopez's "physical and mental weakness and distress". The evidence will show that no such thing occurred.

The presumption of undue influence arises if three elements are shown:

- (1) a confidential relationship,
- (2) active participation in the preparation of the document transferring property, and

(3) undue profit accruing to the beneficiary.

If those elements are shown, a presumption of undue influence arises and the litigant seeking to preserve the status quo has the burden of proving no undue influence. However, "[i]t is for the trier of fact to determine whether the presumption will apply and whether the burden of rebutting it has been satisfied." *Estate of Sarabia*, 221 Cal. App.3d 599, 605 (1990). *See also Estate of Clegg*, 87 Cal. App. 3d 594, 602 (1978) (When a will contestant has shown by a preponderance of evidence that the above elements are present, the burden then shifts to the proponent to prove that the will was not induced by his undue influence).

First, no presumption of undue influence should arise because at least two of the necessary elements will not be established. First, the evidence will not establish that Ms. Esparza "actively" participated in the preparation of the subject grant deed (Ms. Lopez went to a notary's office and had it done there). Second, there is no "undue profit" because the will's codicil already devised the Playground home to Ms. Esparza – not to mention the fact that Ms. Esparza had relocated to Los Angeles and spent years of her life caring for her parents.

Moreover, neurologist Richard Graham and psychologist David Fox will testify about Ms. Lopez's condition in the fall of 1999 and the flaws in the report and conclusions of psychologist Bonnie Wolkenstein. Their testimony will establish that Ms. Lopez knew precisely what she was doing: trying to keep her greedy children from taking control of her money and protecting her ability to reward the one child (Lupe Esparza) who regularly cared for her.

B. <u>Courts Do Not Promote Idle Acts</u>

No grounds exist for the Court to hear or grant the petition as to the Playground property because doing so would waste judicial resources in violation of the Civil Code. It is undisputed that the codicil to the subject will bequeathed "Playground" to Ms. Esparza. Because Ms. Esparza was to receive this property in any event, no benefit would arise from a finding that Ms. Lopez was subjected to undue influence when she gave her daughter the same property she had already bequeathed to her in her will.

Civil Code § 3532 states that "The law neither does nor requires idle acts." Because the result would be the same even if the amended petition's allegations were true regarding the

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"Playground" property, it would be "idle" to have the property returned to the estate and then re-transferred to Ms. Esparza through probate. For this reason, no basis exists to allow the prosecution of this claim.

MS. ESPARZA'S CROSS-PETITION'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE. IV.

Ms. Esparza has asserted cross-claims against the Estate involving (1) the money and labor spent repairing and maintaining Caesar Chavez, and (2) the years she spent caring for Decedent Lopez. [The facts forming the basis for these cross-claims also are the basis for the Offset defense asserted in the answer to the amended petition.]

A. Quantum Meruit

Quantum meruit refers to the established principle that "the law implies a promise to pay for services performed under circumstances disclosing that they were not gratuitously rendered." Long v. Rumsey, 12 Cal.2d 334, 342 (1938). Its underlying idea is "the law's distaste for unjust enrichment. If one has received a benefit which one may not justly retain, one should "restore the aggrieved party to his [orher] former position by return of the thing or its equivalent in money." Maglica v. Maglica, 66 Cal. App. 4th 442, 449 (1998) (emphasis in original).

A plaintiff must establish both that he or she was acting pursuant to either an express or implied request for services from the defendant and that the services rendered were intended to and did benefit the defendant. Ochs v. PacifiCare of California, 115 Cal .App.4th 782, 794 (2004).

Here, the Estate filed no answer to the petition, thereby waiving the opportunity to assert any defenses. Because Ms. Esparza will testify how she expected to receive some sort of reward for the sacrifices she made caring for her mother, she is entitled to the full restitution sought in her amended cross-petition.4

⁴ The Court need not reach this issue because the Estate has no grounds to defend this claim due to its failure to answer the amended petition, but there is precedent for allowing a quantum meruit recovery in this kind of situation. Although Ms. Esparza has not found any California case 28 authority on point, many courts in foreign jurisdictions have held that a child or relative may recover in quantum meruit for care provided, especially when sacrifices are made. See e.g., Palriwala v.

Likewise, common sense dictates finding an implied request by the Estate for Ms. Esparza via Mr. Lozano to do maintenance and repairs on Caesar Chavez while it was the subject of litigation. Otherwise, its value would diminish and someone would suffer. Equally important, the Estate (and the other siblings) never objected to the performance of these tasks despite having full knowledge (this is a family; relatives talk) of how Mr. Lozano was caring for and improving the premises.

B. <u>Common Counts</u>

The common count for services provided is akin to *quantum meruit*. See, e.g., Junho Hyon v. Selten, -- Cal.Rptr.3d ----, 2007 WL 1793153) (2nd District, issued June 22, 2007);

V. THE ANSWER'S WAIVER DEFENSE AS TO THE ESTATE'S CLAIMS REGARDING CERTAIN RENTAL INCOME

The Estate purports to seek to recover the Caesar Chavez rental income that Ms. Esparza and her mother collected <u>after</u> the conservatorship was granted in December 1999 and Ms. Esparza's move to Las Vegas a few years later.

The answer to the amended petition asserts a waiver defense. It alleges that the rental income claims for this period have been waived because during this time conservator Richard Esparza knowingly allowed Ms. Esparza to continue living with and caring for their mother, to continue collecting the Caesar Chavez rental income, and to continue using that money to pay for their mother's living expenses.

Waiver arises from the intentional relinquishment of a known right with awareness of the relevant facts. The waiver may be express, based on the party's words, or implied from conduct indicating an intent to relinquish the right. *Stewart v. Seward*, 148 Cal. App. 4th 1513, 1523 (2007).

Here, the only possible finding is that such a waiver occurred. All of the subject money

Palriwala Corp., 834 N.E.2d 1241 (MA 2005); Ragusa v. Barrett, Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2004 WL 1490233 (2004); Brankline v. Capuano, 656 So.2d 1 (1995); In re Estate of Beecham, 378 N.W.2d 800 (Minn.,1985).

was used to support Decedent Lopez, so Conservator Esparza had no reason to challenge it (or the arrangement by which his mother received free care and companionship from Ms. Esparza – as opposed to having to pay for a caretaker).

VI. MS. ESPARZA'S LACHES DEFENSE

The Court previously denied without prejudice the assertion of the laches defense.

During the trial, Ms. Esparza anticipates that the Court will receive testimony from many witnesses where details and dates cannot be provided because people have forgotten them over the eight years that have passed since the events that form the basis for this dispute.

The doctrine of laches is designed to prevent unwarranted injustice. *See Brewster v. Simpson*, 53 Cal. 2d 567, 594 (1960).

A. The Elements of Laches

The elements of laches are unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice to the defendant. *Johnson v. City of Loma Linda*, 24 Cal. 4th 61, 68 (2000). Unless a petitioner can show that she acted with reasonable diligence, in prosecuting a claim a court will turn a deaf ear. *Williams v. Stillwell*, 217 Cal. 487, 490 (1933).

When adjudicating a laches defense, the Court is to consider how much prejudice was suffered and the reasonableness of the plaintiff. *See In re Marriage of Modnick*, 33 Cal. 3d 897, 909 (1983). These factors are interrelated; the more resulting prejudice, the sooner the plaintiff should have sought relief. *Id*.

B. <u>Prejudice And Unreasonable Delay Exist Here</u>

There can be little credible argument that Petitioner Rosales' six year delay in bringing this action has prejudiced Ms. Esparza. The memories of all witnesses are gone or severely faded, and their mother Ms. Lopez – the most important witness regarding the Estate's claims—is dead (but was alive through March 2005). It would be hard to imagine greater prejudice.

Importantly, the California Supreme Court has held that the loss of witnesses is a factor showing prejudice, and a defendant is <u>not</u> required to show that their testimony would have been favorable. *See Gerhard v. Stephens*, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 904 n. 44 (1968). *See also*

Zakaessian v. Zakaessian, 70 Cal. App.2d 721, 727 (1945) (death of a material witness is to be considered when adjudicating laches defense).

In addition, prejudice can be presumed because Ms. Rosales filed her petition after the normal five year statute of limitations. *See Fountain Valley Regional Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta*, 75 Cal. App. 4th 316, 323-324 (1999); C.C.P. §§ 318 and 328.

Because each of these circumstances exists here, laches bars the subject claims.

VII. MS. ESPARZA'S FRAUD & RESCISSION CLAIM AGAINST WHITEHORN.

California Civil Code § 1709 defines fraud as follows: "One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers." The species of fraud relevant to this action is as follows:

 Intentional misrepresentation ("The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true");

The elements of fraud (whether through a misrepresentation or concealment) are: (1) misrepresentation; (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to defraud, *i.e.*, to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage. Civil Code § 1709; California's Book of Approved Jury Instructions (BAJI) 12.30 et seq.; <u>Harazim v. Lynam</u>, 267 Cal. App. 2d 127, 130, 72 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1968), <u>quoting</u>, 5 Witkin, Summary of California Law, Section 676.

Civil Code § 1689(b)(1) provides that a party may rescind a contract where in was procured by fraud. See, e.g., Miller v. Busby, 101 Cal. App.2d 83 (1950) (Evidence warranted rescission of sale of motel for vendor's false representation as to net income received from motel during previous season).

In addition to rescission, Ms. Esparza is entitled to recover punitive damages against Whitehorn due to his use of fraud to induce her to sign the subject deeds and agreement. See C.C. § 3294(a); Horn v. Guaranty Chevrolet Motors, 270 Cal. App. 2d 477, 484 (1969).

DATED: July 6, 2007

VIII. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS BARS WHITEHORN'S CROSS-PETITION

The doctrine of unclean hands requires that a plaintiff have acted "fairly" in the matter for which he seeks relief. Misconduct that soils a party's hands includes not only an actionable tort but also "any conduct that violates conscience, or good faith, or other equitable standards of conduct." Kendall-Jackson v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 4th 970, 978 (1999), rhrng denied, review denied. Such an act bars legal and equitable claims if it relates directly to the conduct at issue in the lawsuit. <u>Id</u> at 978-979.

Here, the evidence will show that Whitehorn used lies to induce Ms. Esparza to deed him interests in the subject property and sign the subject consulting agreement. Because these acts soiled Whitehorn with unclean hands, he is not entitled to any relief from the Court. See Burton v. Sosinsky, 203 Cal. App. 3d 562, 574 (1988) (plaintiff's conspiracy to commit fraud supported unclean hands defense); Samuelson v. Ingraham, 272 Cal. App. 2d 804 (1969) (unclean hands applies to attempts to defraud as well as accomplished fraud).

Respectfully submitted,

THE COWAN LAW FIRM

By:

Jeffrey W. Cowan

Attorneys for Respondent Lupe Esparza

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PROOF OF SERVICE

I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action; my business address is 1541 Ocean Avenue, Suite 200, Santa Monica, California 90401.

On July 6, 2007 I served Respondent and Cross-Petitioner Lupe Esparza's Trial Brief the interested parties in said action as indicated below:

> Michael I. Schiller, Esq. 3838 Carson Street, Suite 106 Torrance, CA 90503 [(310) 792-7798; fax (310) 792-2529 [counsel for Jack Whitehorn]

[] [BY MAIL] by placing a copy of said document for collection and mailing on the
uale ilidicated above. In a sealed envelope(s) addressed as set forth above, purguent to and
business practices. I am readily familiar" with this tirm's practice of collecting and agreed
correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the LLC Destal Commission
at Santa Monica, California on that same day in the ordinary course of business.

- [BY PERSONAL SERVICE] by placing the original a copy document (s) for collection and mailing on the date indicated above, in a sealed envelope(s), addressed as set forth on the attached service list, and delivered to each addressee by a messenger employed by Magnum Courier Service.
- [BY EMAIL] by transmitting a true copy by email to each of the above counsel. [x]
- [BY OVERNIGHT COURIER] I caused to be delivered to and served by an Overnight Courier on all interested parties in said action, the above named document(s) by placing true copies thereof in enclosed sealed envelopes, delivery fees paid or provided for, and addressed as set forth above.
- [STATE] I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on July 6, 2007, at Santa Monica, California.

Jeffrey W. Cowan

PROOF OF SERVICE

I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action; my business address is 1541 Ocean Avenue, Suite 200, Santa Monica, California 90401.

On July 6, 2007 I served **Respondent and Cross-Petitioner Lupe Esparza's Trial Brief** the interested parties in said action as indicated below:

Cory C. Brendel, Esq. 301 E. Colorado Boulevard, Suite 204 Pasadena, CA 91101

[Tel: (626) 793-8000 Fax: (626) 793-9600]; Attorneys for Petitioner

- [] [BY MAIL] by placing a copy of said document for collection and mailing on the date indicated above, in a sealed envelope(s), addressed as set forth above, pursuant to ordinary business practices. I am "readily familiar" with this firm's practice of collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service at Santa Monica, California on that same day in the ordinary course of business.
- [x] [BY PERSONAL SERVICE] by delivering a copy of this document to the office of Cory Brendel.
- [] [BY EMAIL] by transmitting a true copy by email to each of the above counsel.
- [] [BY OVERNIGHT COURIER] I caused to be delivered to and served by an *Overnight Courier* on all interested parties in said action, the above named document(s) by placing true copies thereof in enclosed sealed envelopes, delivery fees paid or provided for, and addressed as set forth above.
- [X] [STATE] I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on July 6, 2007, at Santa Monica, California.

Jeffrey W. Cowan